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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The saga of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. can be traced back 
to 1998 when the petitioner Caperton filed suit against Massey and 
several affiliates in the circuit court of Boone County, West Virginia.1 
At the heart of Caperton’s complaint was a contract dispute, and 
following a lengthy trial in 2002, a Boone County jury returned a 
verdict of just over $50 million for the petitioners.2 During the ensuing 
seven years, Caperton v. Massey—in all its various permutations—has 
generated an enormous amount of national attention, both inspiring a 
best-selling novel3 and prompting two editorials in the New York 
Times that called for the Supreme Court to review the case.4 
Proponents of judicial election reform have seized upon Caperton as 
emblematic of all that is wrong with the way judges are selected in 
many parts of the United States.5 Indeed, the petitioners allege that 
the case motivated Massey’s CEO to work to defeat a sitting justice of 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and elect his 
 
 * 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, at 10 (W. Va. April 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/spring08/33350R.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 11. 
 3. Paul J. Nyden, Novel Linked to State Election, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 2008, 
available at http://www.wvgazette.com/News/200801290715; see also JOHN GRISHAM, THE 
APPEAL (Doubleday 2008). 
 4. Editorial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A36; Editorial, Too Generous, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at WK8. 
 5. See, e.g., Brief of Justice at Stake, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–
3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 45976. 
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replacement.6 In a final twist, Caperton may yet lead to an important 
ruling from the United States Supreme Court on the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The original contract 
dispute has thus come a long way. 
Following the initial $50 million verdict, Massey filed numerous 
post-trial motions before finally seeking review of the trial court’s 
decision in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in October 
2006.7 The composition of the Supreme Court of Appeals—West 
Virginia’s only appellate court—changed significantly in 2004 when a 
political newcomer, Brent Benjamin, defeated the incumbent Justice 
Warren McGraw to gain one of the court’s five seats.8 The chairman 
and CEO of Massey, Don L. Blankenship, played a major role in 
Benjamin’s 2004 campaign, spending some $3 million of his own 
money in an independent effort to defeat Justice McGraw.9 When 
Caperton v. Massey came before the Court of Appeals, Caperton 
repeatedly moved for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself given the 
political support Benjamin had received from Mr. Blankenship.10 
Benjamin refused to do so and twice cast the deciding vote in favor of 
overturning the original jury verdict.11 In November 2008, the 
Supreme Court granted Massey’s petition for a writ of certiorari to 
decide the question of whether due process requires a judge to recuse 
himself when he has been the beneficiary of a litigant’s significant 
campaign contributions.12 
II.  FACTS 
Though largely beyond the scope of this commentary, the 
underlying conflict between the parties to this dispute began in the 
late 1990s. As one of the nation’s largest coal companies, Massey was 
seeking to expand its market share by acquiring the business of LTV 
Steel.13 LTV, however, had repeatedly refused Massey’s direct 
overtures, preferring to purchase coal supplied by the Harman Mine 
 
 6. Brief for Petitioners at 5–8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29, 
2008), 2008 WL 5433361. 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 6–8. 
 10. Id. at 9–14. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008) (mem.). 
 13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 
(U.S. July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568. 
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in Buchanan County, Virginia.14 The petitioner, Caperton, owned the 
Harman Mine and sold all of its coal to the Wellmore Corporation, 
which acted as an intermediary between the Harman Mine and LTV 
steel.15 To circumvent this arrangement, Massey purchased the parent 
company of Wellmore, planning to substitute the Massey coal for that 
of the Harman Mine.16 But after Massey’s acquisition of Wellmore, 
LTV still refused to purchase the Massey coal and subsequently broke 
off its business relationship with Wellmore.17 At the direction of 
Massey, Wellmore then terminated its contract to buy coal from the 
Harman Mine, invoking the force majeure clause in its contract with 
Caperton.18 The termination occurred late in the year, effectively 
preventing Caperton from securing another purchaser.19 At this same 
time Massey entered into negotiations to purchase the Harman 
Mine.20 Massey later withdrew from these negotiations, but only after 
it had obtained confidential information that Massey then used to 
strengthen its position against Caperton.21 
The combined result of Massey’s actions drove Caperton into 
bankruptcy, and in 1998 Caperton sued Massey in West Virginia for 
fraudulent misrepresentation, tortious interference with existing 
contractual relations, and fraudulent concealment.22 Caperton filed 
this action against Massey in Boone County, West Virginia, after first 
filing suit against Wellmore in Buchanan County, Virginia.23 As a 
result, Massey sought to dismiss the West Virginia suit, alleging that a 
forum selection clause required that any action be brought in Virginia 
and that Caperton’s claims were precluded on the basis of res 
judicata.24 The West Virginia trial court rejected both arguments, and a 
jury in Boone County delivered a verdict of $50 million for Caperton 
in late 2002.25 Massey filed a variety of post-trial motions but did not 
 
 14. Id. at 3–4. 
 15. Id. at 4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 4–5. 
 22. Id. at 5. 
 23. Brief for Respondents at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 28, 
2009), 2009 WL 216165. 
 24. Id. at 6–7. 
 25. Id. at 7. 
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actually appeal the decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals until 2006.26 
In the intervening four years, Massey’s CEO, Don L. Blankenship, 
became heavily involved in an election for one of the seats on that 
court.27 In 2004, the incumbent, Justice Warren McGraw, sought re-
election to a twelve year term on the Supreme Court of Appeals but 
faced a challenge from a “political newcomer,” Charleston lawyer 
Brent Benjamin.28 Following a particularly acrimonious campaign, 
Benjamin surprised many and narrowly defeated McGraw.29 During 
the campaign Mr. Blankenship spent over $3 million of his personal 
fortune to help defeat Justice McGraw.30 Only $1,000 went to 
Benjamin’s campaign directly; most of the rest—nearly $2.5 million—
went to fund a “527 organization,”31 And For The Sake Of The Kids 
(“ASK”), which Blankenship helped found.32 The express purpose of 
ASK was to defeat Justice McGraw, and the organization worked 
towards that goal mainly by producing and publishing negative 
advertisements that targeted McGraw and his judicial record.33 
Beyond his support for ASK, Blankenship spent another $500,000 to 
purchase anti-McGraw advertisements in newspapers and on 
television.34 Finally, Blankenship conducted an extensive letter-writing 
campaign aimed at West Virginia physicians. In these letters, 
Blankenship appealed for donations to Benjamin’s campaign and 
claimed that defeating Justice McGraw would lead to lower medical 
malpractice premiums.35 
Two years after Benjamin’s 2004 election, Massey finally 
petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to review its 
case.36 At that time both sides sought to have judges recuse 
 
 26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 6. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A15. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 6–7. 
 31. Named after the section of the United States tax code that created them, “527 
Organizations” are tax-exempt organizations formed to influence political campaigns. Neither 
state nor federal election commissions regulate their contributions or activities. See generally 26 
U.S.C.A § 527 (West 2007). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 7. 
 35. Id. at 7–8. 
 36. Id. at 9–10. 
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themselves.37 Predictably, Caperton requested the recusal of the new 
justice, Brent Benjamin, on grounds that Mr. Blankenship’s 
extraordinary support for Benjamin’s campaign created an 
unconstitutional appearance of bias.38 For its part, Massey sought the 
recusal of Justice Larry Starcher, who had publically criticized 
Blankenship for his involvement in Justice Benjamin’s 2004 election.39 
Per the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, both motions 
were directed at the judges themselves, and neither motion was 
subject to review by the entire court.40 Both judges declined to recuse 
themselves, and in November of 2007, the court issued a 3-2 decision 
that overturned the trial court’s verdict and “created nearly a dozen 
new points of West Virginia law.”41 Justice Benjamin voted with the 
majority, and both Justices Starcher and Albright filed “vigorous 
dissents.”42 
Following its defeat, Caperton filed a petition for a rehearing.43 A 
second scandal broke shortly thereafter: photographs surfaced 
showing Mr. Blankenship and acting Chief Justice Maynard dining 
together in the French Riviera.44 The photographs had been taken 
while the Massey case was on appeal, and Maynard had been one of 
the three votes in the majority to overturn the original trial court 
decision. 45 In the wake of the ensuing scandal, Maynard claimed that 
his “longstanding friendship” with Blankenship had been well-known 
before the appeal came up and that it had not affected his decision; 
nevertheless, he decided to recuse himself from further participation 
in the case.46 A circuit judge appointed by Justice Benjamin replaced 
Maynard, and the new court then voted to accept Caperton’s petition 
for rehearing.47 Before the rehearing, however, Justice Starcher also 
decided to recuse himself, accepting Massey’s argument that his 
 
 37. Id. at 9. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; see also W. VA. R. APP. P. 29. 
 41. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 10; see also Joint Appendix, Volume II, at 340a–
411a, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5422892. 
 42. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11; see also Joint Appendix, Volume II, supra 
note 41, at 420a–431a. 
 43. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11. 
 44. Adam Liptak, West Virginia Judge Steps Out of Case Involving a Travel Companion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/us/19judge.html. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Ian Urbina, West Virginia’s Top Judge Loses His Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/us/15judge.html. 
 47. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 12. 
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criticisms of Blankenship’s political involvement had created a public 
perception of bias.48 Starcher also urged Justice Benjamin to recuse 
himself, but Benjamin held fast, serving as acting Chief Justice for the 
rehearing and appointing two circuit judges to replace Maynard and 
Starcher.49 In April of 2008, this reconstituted court again voted 3-2 to 
overturn the original trial court verdict, and once again Justice 
Benjamin voted with the majority.50 Several months later, Justice 
Benjamin issued a concurring opinion in which he explained, inter 
alia, his decision not to recuse himself.51 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The key question of Caperton v. Massey—whether the Due 
Process Clause is violated when a judge fails to recuse himself from a 
case that involves a significant contributor to the judge’s political 
campaign—is one of first impression for the Supreme Court. 
Traditionally, the states have been left to determine for themselves 
the rules governing recusal in their courts.52 Of necessity, the question 
Caperton presents can arise only in the context of the state court 
system. After all, federal judges are nominated by the President and 
confirmed by the Senate; they have lifetime appointments and are not 
subject to popular elections.53 In contrast, the states employ a wide 
variety of methods for selecting judges, including popular election, 
merit selection, appointment by the governor, and election by the 
state legislature.54 Despite this variety, “all but a handful of States hold 
popular elections to choose at least some judges to some benches at 
some stage of a judge’s career.”55 Just as the methods for selecting 
judges vary from state to state, so too the rules governing the recusal 
of state judges vary, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that 
“most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a 
 
 48. Id. at 13. 
 49. Id. at 13–14. 
 50. Id. at 14. 
 51. Joint Appendix, supra note 41, at 654a–98a. 
 52. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari at 24–26, Caperton v. A.T. 
Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2008), 2008 WL 4126332. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, and art. 3, § 1. 
 54. For a survey of the various means used by the states to select judges, see generally The 
American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection, available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/. 
 55. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party 
at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 45973. 
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constitutional level.”56 The Court has further held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause establishes a “constitutional floor, 
not a uniform standard”;57 the states are therefore free to enact 
stricter rules regarding recusal if they see fit.58 
The notion of judicial recusal stems from the ancient common law 
maxim of aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa: “no man shall 
be a judge in his own case.”59 In Anglo-American jurisprudence this 
was traditionally taken to mean that a judge had to recuse himself 
from any case in which he had a financial interest.60 This principle 
clearly underlies most of the early recusal cases heard by the Supreme 
Court. In Tumey v. Ohio, for example, the Court found a violation of 
due process when a town mayor served as the judge of a criminal 
proceeding but was paid for overseeing the trial only if the defendant 
was convicted.61 The Tumey court famously stated that “every 
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average 
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the 
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, 
and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due 
process of law.”62 
The financial stake of a judge also proved dispositive in Aetna Life 
Insurance v. Lavoie, which involved a bad faith refusal-to-pay claim 
against an insurance company.63 The case came before the Alabama 
Supreme Court, and the justice who authored that court’s opinion and 
cast the deciding vote was also a plaintiff in a similar case pending 
before another state court.64 In vacating and remanding the Alabama 
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that a litigant need not 
prove a judge’s actual bias to show that a violation of due process has 
occurred.65 Rather, a judge who might be capable of impartiality can 
nevertheless be barred from hearing a case because “‘justice must 
satisfy the appearance of justice.’”66 
 
 56. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948). 
 57. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). 
 58. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 2–3. 
 59. John Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–10 & n.14 (1947). 
 60. Id. at 610–12. 
 61. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 62. Id. at 532. 
 63. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986). 
 64. Id. at 813–14. 
 65. Id. at 825 
 66. Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citation omitted)). 
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The financial interest of a judge was considerably less direct in 
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, yet the Supreme Court still found a 
due process violation.67 In Ward, a town mayor both oversaw the 
town’s budget and presided over its traffic court, which provided a 
substantial portion of the town’s income through the imposition of 
various traffic fines.68 The Court found this setup problematic, noting 
that its holding in Tumey concerning the “possible temptation to the 
average man . . . not to hold the balance nice clear and true” was not 
confined only to those situations where the mayor shared in the fines 
his court imposed.69 A system where the judge could be torn between 
two “practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and 
the other judicial,” also violated a defendant’s due process rights.70 
The Supreme Court has also held that recusal was constitutionally 
required in at least two cases that did not involve any pecuniary 
interest on the part of a judge. In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, the Court 
held that a judge could not preside over a criminal defendant’s 
contempt proceedings if the same judge had been subjected to the 
verbal abuse that prompted the proceedings.71 Similarly, the Court 
found in Taylor v. Hayes that a judge could not preside over a lawyer’s 
contempt proceeding when the same judge had been involved in a 
lengthy dispute with the lawyer during the trial.72 “[T]he inquiry,” the 
Court held, “must be not only whether there was actual bias on 
respondent’s part, but also whether there was ‘such a likelihood of 
bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the 
balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the 
interests of the accused.’”73 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A. Petitioners and Supporting Amici Curiae 
Caperton’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari relied heavily on the 
cases described above, noting that “the appearance of impropriety 
created by the $3 million that Mr. Blankenship spent on Justice 
 
 67. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
 68. Id. at 57–58. 
 69. Id. at 60. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
 72. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974). 
 73. Id. (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964)). 
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Benjamin’s campaign is at least as strong as the appearance of 
impropriety in Murchison, Mayberry, and Lavoie.”74 Curiously though, 
Caperton’s merits brief largely abandoned the argument that an 
“appearance of bias” has constitutional implications for due process.75 
Instead, Caperton argued that Tumey, Murchison, and their progeny 
imply that due process requires a judge’s recusal “where an objective 
inquiry establishes a probability of bias on a judge’s part.”76 For 
example, a judge would not have to recuse himself from a case 
involving a supporter whose “contribution represents only a small 
fraction of the overall financial support for the judge’s campaign.” If 
the contribution is small, Caperton suggested, “no reasonable 
observer would conclude that such modest campaign support creates 
a probability that the judge is biased in favor of the supporter.”77 In 
contrast, an objective observer would conclude from the facts 
surrounding Caperton v. Massey and the Benjamin campaign that 
Justice Benjamin was probably biased.78 
Caperton provided five reasons to support this contention, 
implicitly suggesting that the Court could use these reasons to 
establish a test to determine when campaign contributions implicate 
the Due Process Clause.79 Caperton’s first reason was based on the 
“sheer volume” of Mr. Blankenship’s support: beyond West Virginia’s 
limit of $1,000 in direct support,80 Blankenship’s personal contribution 
of $3 million to the overall campaign effort was $1 million more than 
the total amount spent by the campaign committees of McGraw and 
Benjamin combined.81 This fact was closely tied to the second reason 
that an objective observer would find a reasonable probability of 
bias—the amount of Blankenship’s support as a percentage of the 
total amount spent on Benjamin’s campaign. Here, Blankenship’s 
support was 60% of the total amount.82 
Caperton’s final three reasons why an objective inquiry could 
have established a probability that Benjamin was biased were—unlike 
 
 74. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 19–20. 
 75. This change of strategy did not go unnoticed by Massey: see Brief for the Respondents, 
supra note 23, at 1. 
 76. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 15. 
 77. Id. at 26. 
 78. Id. at 27. 
 79. Id. 
 80. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(f)(2005). 
 81. Id. at 28. 
 82. Id. 
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the first two—not directly financial. The third was that Blankenship 
“actively campaigned” for Benjamin by writing letters and soliciting 
donations; he therefore deserved at least some credit for raising a 
substantial portion of the money that went directly to Benjamin’s 
campaign committee.83 Fourth, Caperton noted the suspicious timing 
of Blankenship’s involvement, which looked as though it “was 
intended to influence the outcome of th[e] . . . appeal.”84 Fifth and 
finally, Caperton pointed to the procedural process governing recusal 
in West Virginia. There, when a judge decides not to recuse himself, his 
decision is not subject to review by the other members of the court. In 
states where such a decision is reviewed, “the likelihood of judicial 
bias may be diminished because the allegations of bias have been 
examined . . . by the judge’s colleagues.”85 
The five factors set forth in Caperton’s brief on the merits—the 
contribution volume, the volume as a percentage of the total amount 
spent, the litigant’s active support for a candidate, the timing of the 
contribution, and the procedure for reviewing recusal decisions—
were essentially endorsed and amplified in several amicus briefs. The 
American Bar Association (ABA), for example, conceded the 
impossibility of establishing any fixed amount of contribution beyond 
which a judge would have to recuse himself.86 Election costs vary from 
state to state, and what would be a large amount in one state may not 
be so in others. The ABA nevertheless concluded that “a contribution 
that is unusually large in absolute or relative terms, or that results in 
an appearance of dependence on the contributor, should weigh 
heavily in favor of recusal.”87 The ABA also suggested that the Court 
consider the timing of the contribution and the “relationship between 
the contributor and the case.”88 
Like the ABA, the Conference of Chief Justices proposed that 
Caperton is an opportunity for the Court “to clarify the analysis to be 
considered in deciding whether a recusal is constitutionally required 
because of campaign support.”89 Among the criteria the Conference 
believed to be important were (1) the size of the expenditure 
 
 83. Id. at 29. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 29–30. 
 86. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 
19, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45978. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 19–20. 
 89. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 24. 
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considered relative to the size of the electorate; (2) whether the 
support is direct or—as in Caperton—mainly indirect; (3) the timing 
of the support; (4) the actual and perceived effectiveness of the 
support; (5) the nature of the supporter’s prior political activities; (6) 
the nature of any prior relationship between the contributor and the 
judge; and (7) the relationship between the supporter and the actual 
litigant.90 
Several pro-business research centers and numerous major 
corporations also wrote amicus briefs in support of Caperton. In 
essence, these parties pleaded with the Court to save American 
businesses from their own worst instincts. One amicus brief argued 
that if the Supreme Court does not act to require judges who have 
received substantial contributions to recuse themselves, then a 
business, its shareholders, and its board of directors might well be 
forced “to support candidates whose judicial philosophies represent 
the company’s best interests in pending or anticipated litigation.”91 
This brief likened the situation to a classic “prisoner’s dilemma”: 
For ethical and financial reasons, most corporations would prefer 
to avoid spending money on an election that involves candidates 
for a seat on a court where it has a matter pending. . . . In today’s 
election environment, however, a corporation must consider the 
likelihood that its opponent in high-stakes litigation may actively 
support one or more of the judges that will hear the case. 
Increasingly, corporations feel compelled to support their own 
candidates to guard against an adverse judgment that damages the 
company and its shareholders. Mandatory recusal is necessary to 
stanch this campaign spending arms race and maintain the 
integrity of the judicial system.92 
Wal-Mart, Pepsico, Lockheed-Martin, and other prominent 
American businesses expressed somewhat related concerns in their 
own amicus brief supporting Caperton. These corporations argued 
that the public’s confidence in a fair and independent judiciary “is of 
particular value to those engaged in commerce, who rely on 
evenhanded justice to make informed financial and investment 
 
 90. Id. at 25–29. 
 91. Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin 
Center for Business Ethics Research as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–11, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45977. 
 92. Id. at 4. 
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decisions.”93 If justice can be bought through political contributions, 
the legal framework upon which businesses “assess risks and calibrate 
benefits” becomes far less predictable and less reliable.94 
B. Respondents and Supporting Amici Curiae 
In a lengthy concurring opinion filed some three months after the 
second Massey decision came down, Justice Benjamin addressed his 
decision not to recuse himself.95 Many of the arguments he touched on 
in his concurrence were picked up and amplified by Massey in its 
brief for the Supreme Court. Benjamin initially addressed and 
rejected the argument that a judge should recuse himself based on an 
appearance of impropriety. The Supreme Court, Benjamin contended, 
has never endorsed appearance-driven recusal; in fact, many appellate 
circuits have “rejected the contention that appearance driven 
conflicts, without more, raise due process implications.”96 Although 
Benjamin dismissed the argument that appearances demanded his 
recusal, his version of the facts mitigated the “appearance” of bias. For 
one, Benjamin pointed out that Blankenship’s money went to a 527 
organization and not directly to his campaign. “I had no role and no 
control in anything that ASK did during the campaign,” Benjamin 
maintained, “nor did I have any role in causing Mr. Blankenship or 
anyone else to contribute to ASK or otherwise do or not do anything 
in the 2004 Supreme Court election.”97 Benjamin also observed that 
on other occasions he had voted against Massey’s interests, including 
on cases that had involved a higher dollar amount than the case sub 
judice.98 
Massey’s merits brief reiterated these same arguments, rejecting 
the idea of appearance-driven recusal and suggesting instead that 
Tumey, Lavoie, and the Court’s other Due Process Clause decisions 
are merely applications of the common law maxim that “‘a judge with 
 
 93. Brief of Amici Curiae The Committee for Economic Development et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 
45974. 
 94. Id. at 8–9. 
 95. Joint Appendix, supra note 41, at 654a–98a. 
 96. Id. at 665a (citing Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2004); Callahan v. 
Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 928–29 (11th Cir. 2005); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31 
F.3d 1363, 1371–82 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). 
 97. Id. at 685a. 
 98. Id. at 674a–75a, n.29. 
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a financial interest in the outcome of the case may not sit.’”99 Massey 
also suggested that the Court’s holdings in Mayberry and Taylor, 
though admittedly not involving a judge’s pecuniary interest, were 
still “contempt-specific” and did not “rest on any generalized 
acceptance of a constitutional ‘probability of bias’ standard.”100 
Moreover, were the Court to accept such a standard now, Massey 
contended, its adoption would suggest that many members of the 
Supreme Court itself had acted unconstitutionally over the past two 
hundred years. Most notably, Chief Justice Marshall was both the 
author of the Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison and the cause of 
the litigation!101 In contrast to his participation in Marbury, Marshall 
recused himself from adjudicating Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, because 
in Martin, Marshall had a pecuniary interest.102 Thus, Massey 
summarized, “there is no basis in history, precedent, or the practice of 
this Court for the notion that a judge’s ‘bias’ in general—let alone a 
mere ‘probability of bias’—mandates disqualification under the Due 
Process Clause.”103 
Massey and supporting amici also raised the specter of an 
onslaught of due process challenges to state court decisions if the 
Court were to endorse a “probability of bias” standard.104 Massey’s 
brief criticized the “‘vague and malleable’” guidelines offered by 
Caperton and supporting amici, and suggested that the impossibility 
of drawing a constitutional line would “open the gates for a flood of 
litigation.”105 Seven states echoed these concerns in an amicus brief, 
predicting that a reversal “will give birth to a new breed of litigation 
pleading: the ‘Caperton motion.’”106 Every state-court recusal dispute 
would be at risk of becoming a federal case in which a “multifactor 
morass” would need to be applied to determine whether a judge was 
required to recuse himself.107 “While that sort of hypercontextualism 
may well be appropriate to legislative policymaking on the state 
 
 99. Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 19 (quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of 
Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)). 
 100. Id. at 23. 
 101. Id. at 25–26; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 102. Id. at 26–27; see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 103. Id. at 15. 
 104. Id. at 44–46. 
 105. Id. at 44 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring)). 
 106. Brief of the States of Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28, 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Feb. 4, 2009) 2009 WL 298466. 
 107. Id. at 5. 
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level,” the brief concluded, “it is not the stuff of which constitutional 
doctrines should be made.”108 
V.  PROBABLE DISPOSITION 
Given the widespread support for Caperton and the calls for 
action by various amici across the political spectrum, the Supreme 
Court may clarify that due process requires a judge who has received 
substantial campaign support to recuse himself from a supporter’s 
case. Massey’s arguments will have little appeal to the Court’s liberal 
justices. And even the Court’s conservative justices may decide that 
the weight of the argument lies with Caperton and the independent 
groups advocating on Caperton’s behalf. Indeed, this is not a case that 
breaks down easily along ideological lines; both major corporations 
and the liberal-leaning Brennan Center at New York University have 
written amicus briefs supporting Caperton, and Ted Olson, the 
solicitor general during President George W. Bush’s first 
administration, is arguing Caperton’s case.109 
Certainly the neo-federalists on the Court will be inclined to 
sympathize with at least some of the arguments advanced in Massey’s 
brief. Recusal in state courts is generally a matter of state concern, 
and some conservative justices will be wary of federalizing this 
domain, especially with fuzzy standards that leave room for creative 
lawyering.110 If, however, the Court can agree on explicit standards 
that both give guidance to the states as they make their own reforms 
and prevent an onslaught of potential “Caperton challenges” to state 
court decisions, some of the more conservative justices might join in a 
vote for the petitioners.  
 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Committee for Economic Development et al. in Support 
of Petitioners, supra note 93; Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU 
School of Law, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 
(U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45972; see also Paul J. Nyden, Mining Appeal Moving Along, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 16, 2008, available at http://www.wvgazette.com/ 
News/200805150741 (reporting on Olson’s taking the case). 
 110. See generally David Franklin, The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election, and the Future of 
the Judiciary, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 513, 515 (2008) (“We are obviously still very early in 
the career of Chief Justice John Roberts, . . . but it’s already clear that one way in which Roberts 
is similar to Justices Scalia and Thomas is that he has a strong preference for what he views as 
clear, bright-line, judicially imposed rules as opposed to what he views as broad, fuzzy, 
manipulable, open-ended standards.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing generally for a rule-based approach). 
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In its amicus brief the Conference of Chief Justices directly 
addressed the fear that a ruling for Caperton would open the 
floodgates to thousands of challenges based on due process grounds. 
The Conference concluded, however, that this fear was “unfounded” 
since federal review of a state judge’s failure to recuse himself “would 
be limited to cases of extraordinary [campaign] support.”111 Given the 
bi-partisan and neutral position of the Conference, its opinion may 
help to sway some conservatives on the Court who have misgivings 
about federalizing another due process standard. 
Caperton’s change between its petition for certiorari and merits 
brief from an “appearance argument” to a “probability of bias” 
argument may also be an attempt to win over the Court’s most 
conservative members. Indeed, Justice Scalia was very skeptical when 
the Sierra Club asked him to recuse himself from Cheney v. U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia because of an appearance 
of bias.112 “The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can ‘reasonably 
be questioned,’” Justice Scalia declared, “is to be made in light of the 
facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or reported.”113 
Even in Cheney, though, Justice Scalia conceded that the Sierra Club’s 
argument that he should resolve all doubts in favor of recusal “might 
be sound advice” were he sitting on an appellate court where the case 
“would be taken by another judge, and . . . proceed normally.”114 
Because the case was before the Supreme Court, however, Cheney 
would have been forced to proceed with only eight judges, creating 
the possibility of a tie vote.115 Obviously the procedures of the West 
Virginia Supreme Court are closer to those of a federal appellate 
court: had Justice Benjamin recused himself, another circuit judge 
would have been appointed to take his place. 
Finally, Massey’s suggestion that a “probability of bias” standard 
has no support in either the common law or an original understanding 
of the Due Process Clause is clearly an appeal meant to resonate with 
the Court’s conservative justices. Nevertheless, this argument ignores 
the fact that judicial elections, especially those that involve significant 
expense and campaign contributions, are an entirely modern 
 
 111. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 23. 
 112. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al., 541 U.S. 913 
(2004) (Scalia, J., in chambers). 
 113. Id. at 913 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)). 
 114. Id. at 915. 
 115. Id. 
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phenomenon.116 As twenty-seven former justices and chief justices of 
state supreme courts said in their amicus brief, “Novel practices call 
for new paradigms of due process analysis; otherwise, cleverly 
designed schemes and convoluted machinations would eviscerate the 
ancient protections of due process.”117 In deciding to hear Caperton 
this term, the Court may well be on the verge of announcing one of 
these “new paradigms” very soon. 
 
 
 116. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners at 
10, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2009) 2009 WL 45979. 
 117. Id. 
